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This thesis analyzes deliberate attack missions conducted at the U.S. Army
National Training Center (NTC) and checks for relationships between ground force
concentration at a battle point of critical attrition and a mission measure of
effectiveness (MOE). This analysis should facilitate the development of deliberate
attack mission training standards and the monitoring of unit performance in the area
of force concentration or massing of combat power. Graphical methods and
analytic techniques are developed to describe a point of critical attrition in the battle
and various measures of force concentration. The thesis also describes the tank and
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The National Training Center (NTC), located at Fort Irwin, is situated in
southern California, midway between Las Vegas and Los Angeles. Since the
establishment of NTC, in June 1981, U.S. Army combat units have deployed to
this training area to experience a tough, realistic exercise designed to prepare them
for the first two weeks of an actual conflict. Deploying units become the Blue Force
(BLUEFOR) and conduct combat operations against an Opposing Force (OPFOR).
This exercise is the closest simulation of actual combat currently available to these
units. One of the missions of NTC is to provide a data source for Army training,
doctrine, organization, and equipment improvements. This mission is accomplished
by recording various forms of data which describe the "what" and "why" of unit
performance at NTC.
One deficient NTC maneuver trend, that has been recognized since 1982, is the
inability to concentrate overwhelming ground combat power against the enemy
during attack missions. NTC Training Observations, Volume II, released in
September 1982, describes this trend:
There is a general misunderstanding of what it means to
concentrate overwhelming combat power.... The importance of
isolating portions of the enemy and overwhelming him in detail while
fixing the remainder of his force with the minimum force necessary is
generally not practiced. Frontal attacks occur too often rather than
flank attacks which concentrate the task force on platoons and roll up
the enemy from the flank.... Attacking forces are subject to killing
fires of the defender because shock, mass, and a heavy volume of fire
cannot be generated. [Ref. 1: p. C-5]
The above performance trend has continued. When looking at observer
comments about recent NTC attack missions, the term "piecemeal attack" is prevalent.
At the National Training Center Trendline Analysis (NTC TLA) Briefing conducted
on 14 June 1988, GEN Thurman, Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (CG TRADOC), was particularly interested in
maneuver synchronization. GEN Thurman wanted to identify ways to increase
both tank participation and unit massing of fires [Ref. 2: p. 3]. At the May 1989
NTC Trendline Analysis Update, the U.S. Army Armor School concluded:
"massing combat power appears to pay off substantially." This was based on a
subjective evaluation of the comments and data of 72 NTC battles [Ref. 3].
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Analysis efforts in ground maneuver synchronization at NTC have so far been
very qualitative in nature. No formal study has been done on this subject.
Observers and analysts have recognized that a deficient trend exists, but there is little
quantitative analysis of "what happened" to reinforce the qualitative analysis of "why
it happened." BG Funk, Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort
Irwin, during a briefing on this thesis, 21 July 1989, stated that units preparing for
NTC would benefit from more specific mission training standards. This thesis is a
quantitative analysis of selected NTC battles with respect to ground maneuver
synchronization to determine performance measures in this area. This, in turn, will
help identify ground maneuver training standards to improve battle performance.
The scope of this thesis is narrowed by the following constraints and
assumptions:
• Missions were conducted by Tank and Mechanized Infantry Task Forces
with different equipment mixes (description in Chapter II).
• Battles were conducted under the NTC physical and operational environment
(description in Chapter III).
• Only selected deliberate attack missions were analyzed during the Fiscal Year
(FY) 1987 and 1988 time period.
• Results are derived from "post-battle analysis" of killed and live vehicle data
(description in Chapters VII and VIII).
• Attrition data used from the Screened Kill Event Table (SKET), described in
Chapter IV, Section C is assumed to be a representative sample of the actual
attrition events from each mission.
Any extrapolation of the analysis results outside these considerations has not been
validated and could lead to inaccurate conclusions.
C. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS
Using Task Force Deliberate Attack Missions conducted under NTC
Conditions, during Fiscal Years 1987 and 1988, the following synchronization
factor will be analyzed and its influence on Mission Effectiveness: Concentration of
Ground Maneuver Forces at the Battle Point of Critical Attrition.
Once all highlighted concepts in the above problem statement are defined, the
following hypothesis will be tested for validity using data analysis: Given a task
force deliberate attack mission conducted under NTC conditions, there exists a
relationship between the degree of ground force concentration at the battle point of
critical attrition (predictor variable) and a mission's measure of effectiveness or MOE
(response variable) as shown in Figure 1. Such a relationship can lead to quantified
task force training standards for ground force concentration during deliberate attack
missions.
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Figure 1. Thesis Hypothesis
II. THE TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION
TASK FORCE
The U.S. Army unit which is the focus of training at NTC is the Tank and
Mechanized Infantry Task Force, also known as a "heavy" task force.
Understanding the organization and function of this unit is key to the analysis of
NTC ground maneuver synchronization. The following chapter describes this
flexible unit and its role in the employment of Air-Land Battle doctrine. This brief
description is intended only as an introduction to a very complex organization.
More detailed information can be found in Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and
Mechanized Battalion Task Force [Ref. 4].
A. ORGANIZATION
The composition of the battalion task force can vary, depending on its mission.
Task force organization is based on the following definition:
Battalion Task Force : A force generally organized by combining
tank and mechanized infantry elements under a single battalion
commander to conduct specific operations. A battalion task force may
be tank-heavy, mechanized infantry-heavy, or balanced, depending
on the concept and plan of operation. [Ref. 5: p. 1-10]
The sub-elements of the task force are companies from pure tank and mechanized
infantry battalions, which are cross-attached or mixed to form a battalion task force.
The "tank-heavy, mechanized infantry-heavy, or balanced" refers to the ratio of tank
versus infantry companies in the task force. This composition was further
complicated in the 1987-1988 time period due to the Army's ongoing force
modernization. All maneuver task forces which trained at NTC during this period
were organized under the new J-series Table of Organization and Equipment
(TO&E). However, most of these task forces had not received all their modernized
armored vehicles and were still using non-modernized H-series TO&E equipment.
The J-series pure tank battalion, along with modernized and substitute non-
modernized armored tank killing systems, is shown in Figure 2. The major
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Figure 2. J-series Pure Tank Battalion
The J-series pure mechanized infantry battalion, along with modernized and
substitute non-modernized armored tank killing systems, is shown in Figure 3.
Until battalions received IFVs and CFVs, a smaller number of TOW vehicles
(usually ITVs) were substituted as shown below. Major subunits are four
mechanized infantry companies, an anti-tank company, and the headquarters
company (HHC), containing battalion support elements.


















Figure 3. J-series Pure Mechanized Infantry Battalion
Totally non-modernized task forces equipped with M60A1 tanks and Ml 13A1
TOW carriers trained at NTC during FY 1987 and 1988, as well as fully
modernized task forces equipped with Ml Abrams tanks, M2 Infantry Fighting
Vehicles (IFVs), M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFVs), and Improved Tow
Vehicles (ITVs). There were also high-low (modernized and non-modernized) task
force mixes with Ml tanks and Ml 13A1 TOW carriers. There were relatively few
fully modernized task units which trained at NTC during this time period. [Ref. 6]
The brigade (higher unit) commander forms his task forces by cross-attaching
companies from pure tank and mechanized infantry battalions, based on his estimate
of the situation. Additional combat and combat support elements from brigade may
also augment the task force. These additional elements include engineer, air defense,
field artillery fire support, forward air control (FAC), as well as medical,
maintenance, and logistical support teams. The task force commander's estimate, in
turn, may require cross-attaching platoons from his tank and mechanized infantry
companies to form company teams. A sample balanced task force task organization


























Figure 4. Sample Balanced Battalion Task Force Task Organization
B. COMPONENTS AND OPERATING SYSTEMS
There are interacting components within the battalion task force which determine
its battlefield performance. Several key components are listed below:
• Battalion (Task Force) Commander : The task force is a reflection of his
character. He must organize the task force based on the mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and time available (METT-T). Mission
accomplishment is achieved by being aware of his resources and effectively
employing them.
• Company or Team Commanders : These commanders directly employ the
combat power of the task force through fire and maneuver. They must
understand the battalion commander's concept and know how to employ
their combat and combat support assets.
• Scout Platoon : This platoon is one of the primary sources of combat
intelligence before and during the battle. It is not organized or equipped to
conduct independent combat operations.
• Battalion Staff: The staff consists of the Executive Officer (XO), Adjutant
(SI), Intelligence Officer (S2), Operations Officer (S3), Logistics Officer
(S4), and special staff officers. They assist the commander by coordinating
battle operations and also coordinating the combat support (e.g., artillery and
engineer support) and combat service support (e.g., logistics and personnel)
to ensure continuous operations.
The Executive Officer (XO) is both the chief of staff and second in
command.
The Adjutant (SI) is responsible for personnel services and replacement.
The Intelligence Officer (S2) is responsible for battlefield intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination.
The Operations Officer (S3) is responsible for preparing, coordinating,
and disseminating tactical plans and orders.
The Logistics Officer (S4) is responsible for coordination of
maintenance, transportation, and services.
Other special staff officers organic or assigned to the task force include
the fire support coordinator and the Air Force forward air controller
(FAC).
Functions of the task force are divided into seven battlefield operating systems
(BOS). These operating systems must be integrated and synchronized by the
various components of the task force to ensure mission success:
• Command and Control : Subordinates need to know the commander's intent
and concept of the operation. During the battle, the commander should be
located to best see and influence the battle and control his maneuver
companies. They should not be overdependent on radio communication,
since it can be disrupted at critical times.
• Maneuver : Tank and mechanized infantry companies maneuver to destroy
the enemy and seize terrain. Attack helicopter companies maneuver to
destroy the enemy and deny terrain. The synchronization of these companies
in order to mass and bring overwhelming combat power against enemy
weak points is crucial.
• Fire Support : The commander plans and coordinates field artillery, mortar,
and close air support to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy.
• Intelligence : The task force must use its dedicated scout platoon, infantry
patrols, and attached ground surveillance radar (GSR) assets to collect and
report priority enemy information before and during the battle. The brigade
provides intelligence to the task force from other sources.
• Air Defense : The brigade usually provides Stinger or Vulcan air defense
assets. These should be used in coordination with the task force's direct fire
systems. Passive air defense measures, such as concealment, camouflage, and
dispersion have to be practiced.
• Mobility. Countermobility. and Survivability : Engineer assets and all units
perform engineering tasks, such as; digging fighting positions, preparing
obstacles, and breaching enemy obstacles. The task force must survive under
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) conditions by using avoidance and
protection/decontamination assets.
• Combat Service Support: The battalion staff coordinates the manning,
arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting of the task force. [Ref.
4: pp. 1-10 to 1-13]
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C . ROLE ON THE AIR-LAND BATTLEFIELD
The task force's role in Air-Land Battle doctrine is maneuver warfare:
In its simplest form, maneuver warfare involves using a part of the
force to find, fix or contain the enemy, while the remainder of the
force attacks his weakest point - usually a flank or the rear. The goal is
to mass enough combat power at the critical time and place to destroy
the enemy or threaten him with destruction, while preserving freedom
for future action. [Ref. 4: p. 1-3]
The battalion is the smallest U.S. Army unit which combines firepower,
maneuver, intelligence, and support. Its area of operations extends from less than
100 meters (in close terrain) out to five or six kilometers beyond the range of its
indirect fire systems. In offensive operations (see Chapter V), the task force is
expected to defeat a defending enemy company, while preserving its force in order
to fight enemy battalion reserves. [Ref. 4: pp. 1-6 to 1-7]
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III. NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC) OPERATIONS
(FISCAL YEARS 1987 AND 1988)
A. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
The National Training Center is situated in the Mojave Desert at Fort Irwin,
approximately 35 miles north of Barstow, California. NTC spans 640,000 acres
(over 1660 square kilometers) of land area; 430,000 of these acres can be navigated
by wheeled and tracked vehicles. The left side of Figure 5 shows the reservation
outline, mountainous regions, and the three principle land corridors used for
training. The force on force (or engagement simulation) training is conducted
mainly in the central and southern corridors. This area is magnified on the right side
of Figure 5 and the primary training areas are identified.
Figure 5. Fort Irwin Military Reservation and Force on Force
Training Area
1 2
An excellent terrain analysis of each area, using the OCOKA (Observation and Fields
of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, and Avenues of
Approach) format is found in Root and Zimmerman [Ref. 7: pp. 14-22].
The weather varies from extremely hot and dry in summer to possible cold and
wet conditions during winter months. During spring and fall, there are large
temperature changes from day to night and high velocity winds. There is low
humidity and a low yearly precipitation of about four inches, usually occurring
during winter. The types of terrain include; flat, open areas, slopes cut by wadis and
arroyos, defiles between mountains and hills, and significant mountain peaks and
ranges. The effect of a lack of vegetation is negligible since the terrain does provide
cover and concealment. The lack of water is a mobility training detractor since there
are no permanent water obstacles. [Ref. 6]
B. OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
The two missions of NTC are: to provide tough, realistic combined arms and
joint services training in accordance with Air-Land Battle doctrine focusing at task
force level, and to provide a data source for training, doctrine, organization, and
equipment improvements. Training is "free play" to the maximum extent possible to
force the unit to operate in an environment close to actual combat. Units are
encouraged to learn from their mistakes and improve. The training atmosphere at
NTC is one directed towards learning, not testing. [Ref. 6]
When looking at mission performance of task forces at NTC, the seven
battlefield operating systems (BOS), described in Chapter 2, Section B, are used.
Various forms of data are collected on unit performance, but the intent is not to
determine which side won the battle. These data collection efforts must be
13
transparent to the training effort by not impacting on the time, resources, or free
play of the training unit.
After each mission, after action reviews (AARs) were facilitated by NTC
personnel at levels of command ranging from platoon to brigade. The task force
AAR was conducted about five hours after change of mission and was attended by
the task force chain of command down to company commanders and the task force
staff. The purpose of the AAR was to determine "what happened", "why it
happened", and how to improve in future missions.
C. UNIT ROTATION DESCRIPTION
During the FY 1987 and 1988 time period, there were 14 rotational training
periods (also called rotations) conducted per fiscal year at NTC. Table 1 shows a
typical rotation schedule. Two task forces trained simultaneously during each
rotation. The first two days consisted of drawing equipment and moving to the
field. The next 14 days were dedicated to force-on-force training (FFT) and live fire
training (LFT). During the last four days, equipment was turned in and the unit
redeployed to its home station. Heavy task forces normally trained at NTC once
every two years due to the limited number of rotations available and the number of
units requiring training. [Ref. 6]













D. THE OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR)
The Opposing Force (OPFOR) at NTC is designed to replicate a threat
motorized rifle regiment (MRR), which typically consists of three threat motorized
rifle battalions (MRBs). During FY 1987 and 1988, the OPFOR consisted of two
permanently assigned U.S. heavy maneuver battalions along with forward support,
engineer and electronic warfare assets. These OPFOR units were augmented by
dismounted infantry and combat engineers each rotation. An OPFOR motorized
rifle battalion and motorized rifle company, along with their principle combat










13 T-72 32 BMP 4 T-72 10 BMP
Figure 6. OPFOR Motorized Rifle Battalion and Independent
Motorized Rifle Company
Visually modified tracked vehicles (VISMODs) were used to replicate threat T-
72 and BMP tracked vehicles. The M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance
Airborne Assault Vehicle was used as the chassis for these VISMODs. Some actual
threat vehicles were also used, primarily for infantry carriers.
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The OPFOR is a tough opponent. OPFOR units spent over 200 days in the
field each year training and performing against BLUEFOR task forces. Few of
these BLUEFOR units had the time or resources to train this intensely. This field
training time also gave the OPFOR the advantage of being very familiar with the
NTC terrain and proficient at replicating Soviet tactics.
E. INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
1 . General
The NTC instrumentation system consisted of three major subsystems
during FY 1987 and 1988; the Core Instrumentation Subsystem (CIS), the Range
Data Measurement Subsystem (RDMS), and the Range Monitoring and Control
Subsystem (RMCS), as shown in Figure 7. The following NTC instrumentation
description is limited to the CIS and RDMS components, which provided data
during force-on-force training on the location and simulated engagements of
armored ground tank killing systems (tanks and mounted anti-tank missile systems).
The Range Data Management Subsystem (RDMS) collected and provided
data of real time position locations, engagement events and vehicle status to the Core
Instrumentation Subsystem (CIS). This data was collected in the RDMS by the C
unit which controlled the interrogation of more than 40 repeater or A units located
throughout the training area. Data was then relayed to the CIS for processing and
storage.
2. Player Unit Component (PUC)
The key to the RDMS was the player unit component (PUC), also called a
B unit. The PUC included the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
(MILES), which was aligned to the vehicle's direct fire system. MILES was used to
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Figure 7. NTC Instrumentation System
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safe laser transmitter used to produce coded laser pulses simulating the weapon
effect, a pyrotechnic device to simulate the firing signature, and mounted detectors
which received coded pulses from other players and determined the weapon type,
accuracy, and probability of kill of incoming direct fire. The vehicle crew is instantly
aware of a kill, near miss, or hit to its system by audio and visual means. The
number of MILES engagements allowed in a battle was based on the ability of the
unit to resupply the pyrotechnics which simulated live ammunition. If a weapon's
MILES failed during a battle, it was administratively killed.
All armored tank killing systems participating in a battle had a complete
PUC. However, ground mounted TOW and DRAGON tank killing systems, as
well as machine guns and small arms, only had MILES. In addition to MILES, the
PUC included transmitter and interface equipment. The complete PUC would
transmit all MILES events and also a signal known as a range pulse for location
determination. In addition, the PUC could receive commands to abandon or reset
its MILES.
3 . Data Collection
Transmitted MILES event data (including kills, hits, near misses, and
trigger pulls) from a PUC required relay through only one A unit in order to be
collected and passed to the CIS mainframe computer. An instrumented player could
also be killed in other ways. NTC observer controllers (OCs), working with
personnel at the CIS would assess casualties caused by indirect fires and minefields,
and use a hand-held MILES laser (god gun) to kill systems. Also, a system could be
administratively killed or re-keyed directly from the CIS.
The pairing of players in a direct fire engagement and a player's position
location required more complex methods. A time coincidence pairing system was
1 8
used to determine which vehicles were involved in a direct fire engagement, since
there was no positive link between the actual firer and target in the field:
The times of vehicle firings and time of vehicle reaction to MILES
events (i.e., near miss, hit, kill) were all recorded on the RDMS to
within the nearest millisecond. If one instrumented vehicle shot at a
certain time, and another instrumented vehicle died within 5
milliseconds of the shot, the main frame computer went through a
series of subroutines to determine 1) if the position location of both
vehicles was known 2) if the firing vehicle was using a weapon
system capable of producing the MILES effect shown on the engaged
vehicle (i.e., was it a system capable of killing a tank?). If these and
certain other variables are within the parameters of the program, the
system produced a "paired event". [Ref. 6]
In order for determination of position location, a range pulse was sent by the PUC
in response to an interrogation by the RDMS. This pulse had to be received by
three or more A units in order to triangulate the player's location.
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IV. SCREENING OF NTC DATA
A. NTC DATA DESCRIPTION
1 . Nature
The following points need to be understood when analyzing data collected
from NTC. As seen in Chapter III, NTC missions are free play and conducted in a
natural combat environment, with only minimal controls to ensure safety. Activities
are not experimentally controlled, due to the Army training philosophy of fixing
responsibility while underwriting honest mistakes of commission [Ref 8: p. 8].
Analysis of NTC data occurs after the mission is complete, which requires the use of
retrospective or "post-battle" analysis. Military tactics is an art, not a science and the
analysis of data resulting from tactics, is an art which requires logic and common
sense in order to apply the appropriate statistical techniques.
2 . Composition
Data from NTC battles conducted during FY 1987 and 1988 is stored at
the Army Research Institute-Presidio of Monterey (ARI-POM), in the ARI-POM
Combined Training Center (CTC) Archive. The categories of data are based on
format and consist of video, audio, paper, and digital information. Common sense
integration of all available data categories is essential for coherent analysis.
a. Video Data
All task force and brigade AARs, as well as many company and
platoon AARs are stored on Army standard 3/4 inch video tape. The task force
AAR includes; a graphic and narrative replay of the mission, the OPFOR
commander's briefing of his mission, a scoreboard of battle kills, discussions on
20
unit strengths and weaknesses, key personnel intentions and actions, and how to
improve unit performance.
b . Audio Data
Two forty channel voice tapes of FM radio conversations among
various levels of the task force and brigade are recorded and stored. Principle
command and administrative nets are always recorded.
c. Paper Data
The most useful paper product at the archive is the written take home
package. This package contains the most accurate information on task force start
strengths and casualties for each mission in the form of killer-victim scoreboards. It
also contains NTC observer controller descriptions of missions in terms of the seven
battlefield operating systems. Other paper products include operations orders and
overlays and related studies and reports.
d . Digital Data
The heart of the ARI-POM CTC Archive is the INGRES relational
database, contained in a VAX 11/780 computer. The database is created from the
digital data tapes produced at NTC. A separate database is created for each task force
mission and a unique mission name (e.g., MA870712) is assigned. Each mission
database consists of 19 separate tables. These tables contain data collected by the
NTC instrumentation system on different aspects of each mission. The following
descriptions from Briscoe and Baldwin [Ref. 9] concern the tables related to combat
vehicle identification, location, and operational status, as well as combat vehicle
engagement data.
(1) Player, Vehicle, and Weapon Code Table (PVWT). The Weapon
Code Table defines a unique code for each weapon present on the battlefield. The
21
codes allow correlation of MILES codes, vehicle types, and weapons. The PVWT is
static : it doesn't change from database to database.
TABLE 2. PVWT LISTING
pside ptvpe pveh pmiles pwpn
B 01 M60 A1/A3 Tank 12 105mm main gun
B 02 APC 24 M2 Machine Gun
B 03 APC 07 TCW
B 29 Bradley 07 TOW
O 01 Tank (T-72) 1 125mm main gun
O 02 BMP - non weapon
O 03 BMP 14 PKT (73mm)
04 BMP 03 Sagger
Element Element
Name Description Units
PSIDE Side Code O(pfor) or B(luefor) 1 Char
PTYPE Player Type Code 2 Char
PVEH Vehicle Description 15 Char
PMILES MILES Weapon Code 2 Char
PWPN Weapon Description 15 Char
PAMMO Initial Ammunition Load (not used) 5 Char
(2) Player State Initialization Table (PSIT). This table describes the
player list at the beginning of the mission. It includes all players; OPFOR,
BLUEFOR, and WHITE (controller).
TAIILE 3. I>SIT LIS riNG



















PID Player Identification (Bumper number)
LPN Unique Logical Player Number
SIDE B(lue), O(pfor), or W(hite)
INST l(nstrumented) or N(ot instrumented)
PTYPE Player Type Code (See PVWT Table)
CFG Next higher Line Unit










PSTAT Player Status Code-
1: Operational 2:
3: OC Gun Kill 4:






(3) Player State Update Table (PSUT). This table tracks changes to
all players throughout the duration of the mission. Fields that are subject to update
are SIDE, INST, PTYPE, ORG, TRACK and PSTAT.
TABLE 4. PSUT LISTING
time pid Ipn side inst ptype org track pstat
05 Feb 88 03:11:25









TIME Date and Time of Update
PID Player Identification (Bumper number)
LPN Unique Logical Player Number
SIDE B(lue), O(pfor), or W(hite)
INST l(nstrumented) or N(ot instrumented)
PTYPE Player Type Code (See PVWT Table)
CFG Next higher Line Unit
TRACK T(racked) or U(ntracked) by RDMS











(4) Pairing Event Table (PET). The Pairing table will maintain a
time-ordered record of MILES events. It will also contain information relating to the
firer if it is a legitimate pairing event.
TAB LE 5. PE1r lisTING i








05 Feb 88 03:12:41















TIME Date and Time of Update 20 Char
TPID Player Identification (Bumper number) 3 Char
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TLPN Unique Logical Player Number 3 Char
RESULT N(ear miss), H(it), K(ill) 1 Char
FPID Firer ID (Bumper Number) 3 Char
FLPN Firer LPN 3 Char
FWPN Firer Weapon Type (MILES - See PVWT) 2 Char
FRAT Fratricide Indicator (Y/N) 1 Char
TX Target position location X coordinate 5 Char
TY Target position location Y coordinate 5 Char
FX Firer position location X coordinate 5 Char
FY Firer position location Y coordinate 5 Char
(4) Ground Player Location Table (GPLT). This table will maintain
a time-ordered record of player location (PL) coordinates for each instrumented
ground player. PL will be recorded at an operator-selected interval.
TABLE 6. G PLT LISTIIVJG
time plpid pllpn X y
05 Feb 88 03:14:26












TIME Date and Time of PL 20 Char
PLPID Player Identification (Bumper number) 3 Char
PLLPN Unique Logical Player Number 3 Char
X Position location X coordinate 5 Char
Y Position location Y coordinate 5 Char
3 . Completeness and Accuracy
When analyzing the above data, it is necessary to understand problems
with its completeness and accuracy. These problems are a result of the collection
equipment and methods used during FY 1987 and 1988, which are discussed in
Chapter III, Section E. Each of the above tables will be addressed. Even though the
below problems identified in Shadell [Ref. 6] existed, careful integration of all
available data will still give a relatively good representation of certain aspects of NTC
battles.
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a. PVWT and PSIT
The problem with these pre-battle tables deals with completeness.
These tables of fully instrumented players do not include all vehicles and weapon
systems on the battlefield. Only approximately 400 complete Player Unit
Components (PUCs) were available during this period. In most battles, all armored
tank killing systems (tank and vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles) had the PUC,
while ground-mounted TOWs, DRAGONs, and small arms just had MILES. These
ground-mounted systems had MILES weapon effects, but their position location
and engagement events could not be recorded.
b . PSUT and PET
Different types of kill events are recorded on the PSUT and PET. The
PSUT lists changes in player status code (PSTAT) from a "1" (operational) to a; "2"
(combat loss), "3" (OC god gun kill), "4" (accidental kill), or "5" (administrative
kill). A PSTAT of "T would result from a MILES kill. The "3" and "5" kills
usually resulted from indirect or minefield casualty assessments and sometimes from
an administrative kill of a faulty MILES during the battle. The PET lists transmitted
MILES kills as a "K". Both tables have to be cross-checked to obtain the most
accurate kill event data.
MILES events did not get recorded on the PET and PSUT tables if the
PUC was not transmitting, or the transmission was not relayed by an A unit due to
terrain line of sight. Multiple kill transmissions from the same vehicle were
sometimes recorded on the PET table due to faulty PUC components and
occasionally due to boresighting of that vehicle's MILES before or after the actual
battle. In order for the time coincidence pairing algorithm to work; both the firing
and engaged weapon systems had to have a working PUC, the MILES events had
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to be transmitted to the CIS, and both position locations had to be known. These
paired events were at most 20 percent of recorded engagements on the PET table.
Even though the PSUT and PET contain kill events that occur during
a mission, the most accurate summary of kills is found in the written take home
package. These take home packages contain killer-victim scoreboards that were
produced by NTC observer controllers.
c. GPLT
Gaps in GPLT player locations occurred if terrain prevented reception
of a PUC range pulse by three A units. The time interval between player location
updates in this table is selected when the database is created at ARI-POM and is
typically 5 or 10 minutes. This keeps a mission's GPLT length down to
approximately 20,000 rows, but sacrifices accuracy.
B. GROUND MANEUVER FORCE
For the purposes of this analysis, the term "ground maneuver force" refers to
armored tank killing systems. Specifically, BLUEFOR Ml Abrams and M60 series
tanks, Improved TOW Vehicles (ITVs), and M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles
(IFVs/CFVs) are considered. On the OPFOR side, VISMOD T-72 tanks and BMPs
are considered. The terms "ground maneuver force", "force", or "vehicle" in the
analysis refer to the above defined tank killing systems.
C. KILL EVENT DATA SCREENING
In order to analyze kill events of just armored tank killing systems, and because
of the above accuracy problems with the kill event data in the PET and PSUT, the
data needed to be screened. This kill event screening process was accomplished on
the archive's VAX 1 1/780 computer with the FORTRAN/EQUEL program listed in
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Appendix A. The program tailors the kill data and increases its accuracy in the
following ways:
• Only BLUEFOR tank and mounted TOW system kills, and OPFOR T-72
and BMP kills are considered. This corresponds to the definition of "ground
maneuver force" in Section B above.
• Kill events occur before and after the battle due to reasons such as
boresighting MILES. Actual start and change of mission times were obtained
from the NTC Observation Division, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and
kill events are only recorded during this actual mission time period.
• A vehicle is permanently killed after it is first killed in the PET table or it
receives a PSTAT in the PSUT table of "2" (combat loss), "3" (OC gun kill),
or "5" (administrative kill). A PSTAT code "3" (accidental kill) is not
considered a valid kill. Valid re-keying of MILES during the battle is not
identified in the program and is a source of error. However, bringing a
killed player back to life is a relatively rare event in most battles.
• The kill events in the PSUT table do not list an associated location. Therefore,
the program searches the GPLT to find the vehicle's location within one
GPLT time increment of the kill time in the PSUT.
Table 7 shows screened kill event data output from this program. Kill times are
listed in both decimal time (in terms of a 24 hour clock) and integer time (72610 is
7:26:10 hours). If a kill event is obtained from the PET, a "K" is shown under
Code/Result and a fratricide indicator (Y/N) is listed. If the kill event is obtained
from the PSUT, the appropriate PSTAT code is listed under Code/Result.
TAI*LE 7. SCIfcEENED K[ILL EVENIT TABLE (SKET) LISTING
Dec. Int. LPN Side Type Description PID Code/ Frat X Y
Time Time Result
7.4361 72610 140 O 2 BMP 531 2 37400 95738
7.4461 72646 323 B 1 M60 A1/A3
Tank
12A 5 46838 96038
7.7864 74711 234 1 Tank (T-72) D24 K N 39650 94613
7.8836 75301 365 B 1 M60 A1/A3
Tank
32B 2 44250 93350
7.9436 75637 327 B 1 M60 A1/A3
Tank
22A K N 38275 94063
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D. GROUND VEHICLE POSITION LOCATION DATA SCREENING
The locations of live armored tank killing systems at a critical time in the battle
was the other table that needed to be derived. This data also required a screening
process accomplished in the form of the FORTRAN/EQUEL program listed in
Appendix B. The following techniques are used in this program:
• Only armored tank killing system locations are listed.
• The input critical time is compared to the interval times in the GPLT. This
critical time is bracketed on both sides by GPLT times and then a linear
interpolation of both the X and Y grid coordinates is calculated, based on time
interval ratios. This provides a more accurate vehicle location at this critical
time, instead of just using the closest interval time in the GPLT.
• Each vehicle is compared to the Screened Kill Event Table to determine
whether it is alive or killed at the input critical time.
Table 8 shows the screened vehicle location output from this program. The
event time is listed in decimal and integer form, as in the SKET above. The Status
column indicates "L" for live or lists one of the kill codes from the SKET.
TABLE 8. SCREENED GROUND VEHICLE POSITION LOCATION
TABLE (SGPLT) LISTING
Dec. Int. LPN Side Type Description PID Status X Y
Time Time
8.2417 81430 36 o 3 BMP HQ1 L 30125.0 102950.0
8.2417 81430 37 o 1 Tank (T-72) HQ2 K 29550.0 102663.0
8.2417 81430 38 o 3 BMP HQ5 L 29563.0 102725.0
8.2417 81430 39 o 3 BMP HQ6 L 29263.0 116863.0
8.2417 81430 41 o 3 BMP 1 10 L 4875.0 86375.0
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V. TASK FORCE DELIBERATE ATTACK OPERATIONS
A. NTC MISSION SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
The types of missions, such as deliberate attack, conducted by a unit at NTC are
developed by the commander of the task force's parent brigade in conjunction with
NTC personnel. Once the mission list is finalized, NTC personnel create the mission
scenarios. Unique mission scenarios are developed for each NTC rotation. There
are no "standard" or "canned" missions that task forces are given. There will be
certain similarities between missions, due to only a certain amount of key terrain in
the central and southern corridors. The same terrain has been contested in
numerous rotations, but there is always some factor which makes a mission scenario
significantly different from other missions conducted in that area. [Ref. 6]
B. FUNDAMENTALS
Deliberate attack and defense in sector are the two most frequent missions
conducted at NTC. The deliberate attack mission, by its very nature, uses maneuver
more than the defense in sector mission, and is an obvious choice for a maneuver
analysis. Most deliberate attack mission statements at NTC contain the directive to
seize a designated objective area. The following definitions are helpful in
understanding NTC deliberate attacks:
Deliberate Attack : an attack planned and carefully coordinated with
all concerned elements based on thorough reconnaissance, evaluation
of all available intelligence and relative combat strength, analysis of
various courses of action, and other factors affecting the situation. It
generally is conducted against a well-organized defense. [Ref. 5: p. 1-
8]
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Most NTC deliberate attack missions include the directive to seize a piece of terrain,
and the following further clarifies this concept:
Seize : to "clear" a designated area and "obtain control" of it.
Clear : to eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area by
destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that
could interfere with the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.
Obtain Control (Secure) : to gain possession of a position or
terrain feature, with or without force, and to deploy in a manner
which prevents its destruction or loss to enemy action. [Ref. 5]
C. OPFOR DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE
The Opposing Force (OPFOR) at NTC is designed to replicate threat defensive
tactics. During the FY 1987 and 1988 time period, units conducting deliberate
attack missions at NTC may have faced either an independent OPFOR company or
an OPFOR battalion. When faced with an OPFOR battalion, the task force was to
locate and attack one of its weak OPFOR companies. The deliberate attack task force
objective at NTC was placed in the vicinity of an OPFOR company defensive
position. Figure 8 focuses in on a typical threat company defensive position. The
position doctrinally covers a frontage of 1500 to 2000 meters. Obstacles are
planned and executed in three belts, with the approximate ranges of 1500, 1000,
and 400 meters. Even though threat direct fire weapons ranges extend to 4000




Figure 8. Independent Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense
D. CONDUCTING THE DELIBERATE ATTACK
After the task force receives a deliberate attack mission, planning begins.
Reconnaissance should start immediately and continue throughout the mission.
Information about the terrain and enemy disposition is crucial to planning the attack.
The task force is usually organized into a breaching force, an assault force, and a
support force. A company-sized reserve should be retained and can be initially
located in the support force. The task force commander plans his scheme of
maneuver to avoid striking the enemy main strength. The techniques of deception,
surprise, and an indirect approach to strike the enemy's flank and rear should be
used.
3 1
Execution of the attack is divided into four phases. The task force will; close on
the objective, isolate the penetration site, breach or bypass, and exploit the
penetration. During all phases, task force units should deploy, maneuver, and
synchronize in order to provide mutual fire support. During the "close on the
objective" phase, the task force uses available terrain or limited visibility to avoid
enemy detection and maneuver to a position of advantage near the objective. The
commander can enhance the above natural avoidance assets with smoke, fire
suppression, and speed.
In the "isolate the penetration site" phase, the weakest enemy platoon position
needs to be isolated by suppressing adjacent enemy positions with smoke and
indirect fores. Overwhelming combat power is massed at the penetration site.
During the "breach or bypass" phase, shown in Figure 9, obstacle belts are
penetrated by either breach or preferably bypass. The breach is conducted by the
breaching force, usually formed around a mechanized infantry team and mutually
supported by the other task force elements.
In the "exploit the penetration" phase, the assault force passes rapidly through
the breach on a narrow front, becoming the task force main effort, as shown in
Figure 10. The assault force maneuvers and masses its fires to overwhelm and
destroy enemy platoons in detail. An envelopment maneuver, seen in Figure 10, is
preferred. The other task force elements mutually support the assault force and
isolate remaining enemy platoons. The reserve should be prepared for commitment
during this phase. Once the objective is seized (control obtained and cleared of
enemy forces), the task force consolidates and reorganizes or continues the attack.
The objectives of NTC deliberate attacks are the doctrinal objectives of destroying
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forces and seizing terrain, while preserving friendly forces for follow-on missions.
[Ref. 4: p. 3-2]
SMOKE IS EXTENSIVELY USED TO
SCREEN BREACHING OPNS AND
FOR LOCATION DECEPTION
Figure 9. Attack of a Strongpoint - The Breach
°"! FOLLOWS TmB
°L^?.J THROUGH BREACH
Figure 10. Attack of a Strongpoint - Exploit the Penetration
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VI. DELIBERATE ATTACK MISSION SIZE AND MEASURE
OF EFFECTIVENESS
A . BATTLE SIZE DETERMINATION
Continental-based United States heavy task forces usually train at NTC once
every two years (see Chapter 3, Section C). A two year period (FY 1987 and
1988) was initially used as the basis to select deliberate attack missions, due to heavy
task forces training at NTC at least once during this time. Due to data collection time
constraints, this time period was slightly reduced to include all 14 rotations of FY
1987 (rotations 8701-8714) and 10 rotations of FY 1988 (rotations 8701-8710).
Missions categorized as night attacks, hasty attacks, or counterattacks were not
included. The population size of 41 deliberate attack missions from rotations 8701-
8810 is shown in the first column of Table 9.
Upon further analysis of these 41 missions, three accuracy problems were
identified:
• Missions conducted in the Nelson Lake training area generated extremely
inaccurate data in the Ground Player Location Table (GPLT). This was due
to the extremely broken terrain in these areas, which interfered with PUC line
of sight radio transmissions to at least three A units.
• Some missions were stored at the ARI-POM CTC Archive with a GPLT time
interval of 10 minutes (600 seconds) rather than the standard 5 minute (300
second) interval. This 10 minute interval reduced the accuracy of these
missions' position data.
• Modernized task forces included partially instrumented Infantry Fighting
Vehicles (IFVs) and Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFVs). Kills of these
vehicles were recorded in the database, but their locations during the mission
were not recorded in the GPLT.
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TABLE 9. SCREENED BLUEFOR DELIBERATE ATTACK
MISSIOIS LIST
Mission Date NTC Location GPLT Int. Task Force Screened
(sees) Type Missions
AA870104 861008 NELSON LAKE 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)
MA870106 861008 NELSON LAKE 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)
AA870113 861013 NORTH LANGFORDLK 300 Mod(IFV/CFV)
MA870212 861106 LONGFORD WELL LAKE 300 Non Mod MA870212
MA870220 861108 HILL 909 SOUTH 300 Non Mod MA870220
AA870220 8611 10 WHALE GAP 300 Non Mod AA870220
AB870301 861125 RED LAKE PASS 300 Non Mod AB870301
AB870305 861128 AUSTRALIA 600 Non Mod
MA870317 861201 WHALE GAP 300 Non Mod MA870317
MA870319 861202 SIBERIA 300 Non Mod MA870319
MA870404 8701 10 NELSON LAKE 300 Non Mod
AA870432 870122 HILL 909 SOUTH 300 Non Mod AA870432
AA870503 870203 CENTRAL CORRIDOR 600 Mod(IFVZCFV)
AA870512 870206 LANGFORD WELL LAKE 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)
AA870513 870207 AUSTRALIA 600 Mod(IFVZCFV)
MA870604 870226 AUSTRALIA 300 Non Mod MA870604
AA870614 870303 AUSTRALIA 600 Non Mod
AA870616 870304 AUSTRALIA 600 Non Mod
MA870626 870308 GRANITE PASS 300 Non Mod MA870626
AA870721 870331 RED LAKE PASS 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)
AA870734 870404 HILL 909 NORTH 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)




MA870828 870428 HILL 909 NORTH 300 Non Mod MA870828
AA871 115 870716 LANGFORD WELL LAKE 300 High/Low AA8711 15
MA871233 870817 RED LAKE PASS 300 Non Mod MA871233
MA871308 870830 HILL 909 SOUTH 300 Non Mod MA871308
AA871325 870909 NELSON LAKE 300 Non Mod
MA871409 870922 NORTH LANGFORD LK 300 Non Mod MA871409
AA871421 870929 WHALE GAP 300 Non Mod AA871421
MA880212 871 1 13 LANGFORD LAKE 300 Non Mod MA880212
MA880220 871 1 17 CENTRAL CORRIDOR 300 Non Mod MA880220
AA880324 871209 TV HILL(VIC HILL 909) 300 Non Mod AA880324
MA880422 8801 19 SIBERIA 300 High/Low MA880422
MB88051 1 880207 HILL 909 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)
AA880614 880304 LANGFORD LAKE 300 Non Mod AA880614
AA880627 880308 CENTRAL CORRIDOR 300 Non Mod AA880627
MA880632 880308 BROWN-DEBNAM 300 Non Mod MA880632
AA880634 880309 NELSON LAKE 300 Non Mod
MA880730 880402 CENTRAL CORRIDOR 300 Mod(IFVZCFV)
MA881053 880614 VIC HILL 720 300 Non Mod MA881053
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These accuracy problems are highlighted in the third, fourth, and fifth columns
of Table 9. The screened population of accurate deliberate attack missions from
rotations 8701-8810 is shown in the last column of Table 9. These 24 screened
missions constitute the population size of accurate BLUEFOR deliberate attacks used
in the analysis.
The OPFOR also conducts replicated Soviet attacks when BLUEFOR task
forces are assigned a defense in sector (DIS) mission. BG Funk, during a briefing
on this thesis. 21 July 1989, emphasized the proficiency of the OPFOR in massing
its forces at critical places and times during OPFOR attacks. A separate analysis of
OPFOR attacks during BLUEFOR defense in sector missions is conducted,
applying the same methodology used in the BLUEFOR deliberate attack missions
(see Chapter VII and VIII). BLUEFOR defense in sector missions from rotations
8701-8810 were first screened for the three accuracy problems listed above. There
was a population of 48 available screened DIS missions available to analyze. Due to
time constraints, six OPFOR attacks (listed in Table 10) were randomly selected from
these screened missions. These six missions constitute the sample size of accurate
OPFOR attacks used in the analysis.
B. DELIBERATE ATTACK MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
1 . Considerations
The concept of deliberate attack mission effectiveness has to be clearly defined
and then quantified in order to compare mission performances. Initially, the
Department of the Army's Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized
Infantry Battalion Task Force (ARTEP 71-2-MTP) was reviewed. The purpose of
this MTP is to define mission standards for the battalion task force. However, when
checking the maneuver tasks listed in this MTP, the deliberate attack mission is not
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covered. An attack or counterattack by fire mission is listed, but the conditions
clearly state "the intent is not to close with and overrun the enemy position." An
assault mission is also listed, but the conditions state "the enemy motorized rifle
company is in a hasty defense." Neither of these missions are a deliberate attack as
described in FM 71-2 [Ref. 4]. It is interesting to note that quantified task standards
of offensive missions in the MTP consist of percent enemy casualties and percent
friendly survivors. This could serve as a guide to a deliberate attack mission
measure of effectiveness. [Ref. 10]
TABLE 10. SCREENED OPFOR ATTACK MISSION LIST




AA870225 861112 SIBERIA 300 Non Mod
MA871312 870901 SIBERIA 300 Non Mod
AA880212 8711 1
1
SIBERIA 300 Non Mod
AA880320 871208 LANGFORD WELL LAKE 300 Non Mod
MA880415 8801 16 HILL 909 300 High/Low
MA880618 880302 CENTRAL CORRIDOR 300 Non Mod
2 . Description
The framework of the selected deliberate attack measure of effectiveness is based
on doctrinal factors that must be considered in tactical mission planning. These
factors are; mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T). Each
factor is discussed below in terms of NTC deliberate attack missions:
• Mission : All missions are daytime deliberate attacks.
• Enemy : A primary objective of the deliberate attack is the destruction of
enemy forces. This destruction can be quantified in terms of percent enemy
ground maneuver forces destroyed in combat during each mission.
• Terrain : NTC deliberate attacks typically include the mission to seize a piece of
terrain called an objective. There are no doctrinal guidelines which quantify
the concept of seizing an objective. A subjective assessment can be made of
whether the unit seized the objective for each mission, but there is not an
accepted quantitative methodology for making this determination. One
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concept is to use a percentage to measure a unit's performance in seizing an
objective, based on its vehicle locations at end of mission. A follow-on BDM
study to Root and Zimmerman [Ref. 7], will explore this technique. Upon
validation of this study, a percentage measure for seizing terrain could be
incorporated with the "enemy" and "troops available" percentage measures
described in this section. For the purposes of this analysis, a terrain measure
was not included, since it is not currently quantified.
• Troops Available : Another primary objective of the deliberate attack is the
survival of friendly forces for follow-on missions. This survival can be
quantified in terms of percent friendly ground maneuver forces surviving
each mission.
• Time Available : Since NTC missions are scenario-driven, mission planning
and preparation time available for NTC deliberate attack missions is relatively
constant at approximately 20 hours. This factor is expected to uniformly
affect each mission and is not considered in the MOE.
The selected deliberate attack MOE is shown in Figure 11. It is based on the
attrition of ground maneuver forces and includes the quantifiable mission objectives
of enemy force destruction and friendly force survival. These two measures can be
weighted by the commander using an a value between zero and one. In this
analysis, a was set at .5 in order to equally weight the two objectives. Future
deliberate attack MOEs can possibly include a third mission objective dealing with
terrain.
3 . MOE Results for Selected Battles
BLUEFOR and OPFOR deliberate attack MOE results for the selected
missions are listed in Table 1 1 in rank order. The BLUEFOR and OPFOR attrition
data used in this MOE came from each mission's take home packet (see Chapter III,
Section 2). This is the most accurate summary attrition data available, since it was
collected by NTC observer controllers during each mission. The histograms in
Figure 12 are shown to get a general idea of the range and distribution of the MOE
for the selected BLUEFOR and OPFOR missions.
38
*OBJECTIVE (Field Manual 71-2):




at end of mission






at end of mission





(a) % ENEMY + (1-a) %
KILL
TASK FORCE
QiiRVT = DELIBERATE ATTACKSUR IVAL MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Figure 11. Deliberate Attack Mission Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)
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TABLE 11. BLUEFOR AND OPFOR DELIBERATE ATTACK MOE
LISTING
BLUEFOR DELIBERATE ATTACKS
Mission MOE (%) Mission MOE (%)
(Ranked by MOE) (Ranked by MOE)
MA880632 70.238 MA870317 45.676
MA870212 67.160 MA880220 43.954
MA870626 66.667 AA870432 38.616
MA870220 66.165 MA880422 35.253
AA870220 65.126 MA870828 32.677
MA871409 59.790 AA880614 32.064
MA870319 59.524 MA870806 30.401
MA871233 58.081 AA871115 29.688
AA871421 57.986 AB870301 26.331
MA881053 57.895 AA880324 25.521
AA880627 55.556 MA880212 24.313
MA870604 51.470 MA871308 18.295
OPFOR ATTACKS
MA880415 80.410 MA871312 63.104
AA880320 72.619 AA870225 53.187
AA880212 68.086 MA880618 48.554
24 BLUEFOR MISSIONS Selected from Rotatloni 8701-8610
r
r
20 40 00 80
1<0E (X ATXR SURVIVED AND DFDR KILLED)
6 OPFOR MISSIONS Selected from Rotations 6701-8810
100
20 40 SO BO
WOE (X ATKR SURVIVED AND DFDR SILLED)
100
Figure 12. BLUEFOR and OPFOR Deliberate Attack MOE Results
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VII. CONCENTRATION OF GROUND MANEUVER FORCES
AT THE BATTLE POINT OF CRITICAL ATTRITION
A . DETERMINATION OF THE BATTLE POINT OF CRITICAL
GROUND FORCE ATTRITION
In order to focus each deliberate attack mission, based on attrition data of the
ground maneuver forces, the battle point of critical ground force attrition was
defined and quantified using graphical and analytic data analysis. A battle point was
further defined as an area and time during a respective mission. The critical ground
force attrition area was first obtained and then, using this area, the critical ground
force attrition time was derived. This critical ground force attrition time was then
used to measure live vehicle ground force concentration. A sample BLUEFOR
deliberate attack mission (MA870212) is used to describe this methodology.
1 . Deliberate Attack MA870212 Mission Description
A brief mission description and narrative summary of execution for
BLUEFOR deliberate attack MA870212 follows. The battle took place in the OP2
training area. The initial maneuver graphics are depicted in Figure 13, along with
the general terrain features. The task force was to conduct a deliberate attack at 0630
hours to seize the task force objective (NK 4095) and, on order, continue the attack.
The task force task organization consisted of two armor heavy teams, two
mechanized infantry heavy teams and a pure antitank company. The initial
commander's concept was to close on the objective in a task force "V" formation,
with three teams forward and one team and the antitank company in support. The
three forward teams each had specific objectives to seize in the vicinity of the task
force objective, with the reserve team and antitank company providing a base of fire.
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After these objectives were taken, the task force would consolidate, reorganize, and
on order, continue the attack. No task force penetration site was specified and teams
were to individually breach or bypass obstacles.
Figure 13. BLUEFOR Deliberate Attack MA870212 Initial Maneuver
Graphics
Before the mission start time of 0630 hours, the task force scouts
established that there was no enemy on the task force objective. Also, the scouts
established the location of enemy motorized rifle platoons, denoted on Figure 13.
This caused the task force commander to change his concept at 0530 hours. The
objective was changed to coincide with the actual enemy locations. The task force
was to attack in an "H" formation with two teams forward. During actual execution,
the main attack came from the south at 0805 hours, with a supporting attack from
the east. These two attacks effectively engaged the defending motorized rifle
company (MRC) and by 0823 hours, three teams were moving behind the MRC
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position. At 0855 hours, the antitank company had moved forward to engage the
MRC and by 1000 hours, the task force had destroyed the MRC and received a
change of mission.
The deliberate attack MOE for mission MA870212 is 67.16 %, which is
one of the better BLUEFOR MOE scores. The task force scouts performed well in
locating and reporting enemy positions, without being killed. The task force did not
plan for or conduct an isolation or exploitation of a task force penetration site and
therefore, it was more difficult to isolate the enemy platoons and focus task force
combat power. The task force did not have to conduct extensive breaching
operations. The task force was able to defeat the enemy due to the maneuver of
individual teams, aggressive infantry, and a few effective tanks. [Ref. 11]
2 . Critical Ground Force Attrition Area
For this mission, the screened BLUEFOR and OPFOR kill locations from
the Screened Kill Event Table (SKET) formed a scatter plot of points with grid
coordinates represented by the X and Y axes, as seen in Figure 14. All plots were
done in GRAFSTAT, which is a graphics program based on the computer language
APL (A Programming Language).
It was difficult to isolate critical attrition areas, unless enhancement was
done to this graph. First, a bivariate empirical density surface was plotted, as shown
in Figure 15. This plot is explained below:
This function generates a bivariate empirical density of the X and Y
variable entries and plots the density surface (over a rectangular (x, y)
grid). The empirical density is a surface that integrates to one. A
cosine bell with an area inversely proportional to the total number of
points is centered over each (X, Y) point. If X and Y are data values
and x and y are any two (grid) coordinates, then the contribution to
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The WX and WY width entries used were the default entries given by the
formula *max (orYmax)^ Xmin (orYm»0 where N ^ chosen tQ giye ft^ number Qf
intervals that is somewhat larger than 1 + log2(No. of (X, Y) pairs). A 20 by 20
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Figure 14. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Kill Locations
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Figure 15. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Attrition Surface Density
The problem with the density plot in Figure 15 is a lack of differentiation
between BLUEFOR and OPFOR attrition. The highest peak corresponds to the
location with the greatest density of kills, but it is not known whether this attrition
density was an even mix of both sides or a majority of BLUEFOR or OPFOR kills.
This information is important, since an attrition area with the majority of kills from
one side is more critical, and will have greater influence on the force ratio, than an
attrition area with an even exchange of kills.
In order to incorporate the side of each killed vehicle, a relative surface
density plot was created, as shown in Figure 16. This relative density was calculated
exactly the same as the normal surface density plot in Figure 15, except at each
OPFOR killed vehicle location, a raised cosine bell was placed and at each
BLUEFOR killed vehicle location, a lowered cosine bell was placed, showing
relative density of attrition locations, based on side. Positive surfaces (plain lines
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above the plane) show a greater density of killed OPFOR vehicles when compared
to BLUEFOR killed vehicles and negative surfaces (dashed lines below the plane)
show a greater density of killed BLUEFOR vehicles. The GRAFSTAT/APL
function Al 5 4DEN, which calculates the normal bivariate surface density matrix was
modified to calculate the matrix for the relative surface density plot The original and








Figure 16. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Relative Attrition Surface
Density
Another view of this same surface is shown with contour lines in Figure
17. The actual killed vehicle locations were superimposed on this contour plot to
show the positive and negative influence of OPFOR and BLUEFOR kills,
respectively. The highest peak and lowest depression were found and these two
locations indicated the greatest relative attrition centers for that mission. Figure 18 is
a magnification of the region containing these attrition centers. Circular regions
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were then drawn using as center the most extreme attrition peak and depression;
both having a radius of 2000 meters. This radius is based on the estimate of a tank
or TOW being decisively engaged within a range of 2000 meters under NTC
conditions.







Figure 17. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Relative Attrition Surface
Density Contour Plot
After examining the relative attrition density plots of all selected missions,
two categories emerged. The first category, called an "even" battle, is represented by
the above sample mission (MA870212). The relative density plot showed peaks and
depressions, with the greatest peak and depression being relatively close (within
3000 meters). In these "even" battles, the intersection of the greatest peak and
depression circles was used to shape and orient the critical attrition area. The second
category, called an "OPFOR dominated" battle, is represented by a relative density
plot of large depressions and, at most, a few small peaks. In these battles, there were
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not enough OPFOR killed to shape attrition areas. Therefore, the circle centered on
the greatest depression was used as the critical attrition area.
(- KILLED; BLUEFOR VEHICLE!





Figure 18. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Relative Attrition Surface
Density Contour Magnification
3 . Critical Ground Force Battle Time
The critical ground force attrition time for each mission was then derived,
using the critical ground force attrition area obtained above. The kill times of
OPFOR and BLUEFOR vehicles located in the critical attrition area were taken from
the Screened Kill Event Table and compared to the times of all vehicles killed during
the mission. This is shown in the histograms of Figure 19. The X axis represents
24 hour battle time in decimal numbers (7.5 is 07:30:00 hours). The time interval
for each bar is 6 minutes. The Y axis represents the number of BLUEFOR and
OPFOR kills in that 6 minute interval. The reason a histogram was used instead of
techniques such as cosine smoothing functions was because of the preference to see
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an exact number of kills in each time interval. When comparing these two
histograms for all selected missions, it appeared that the kill times were filtered from
the entire battle area to the critical attrition area. The majority of kills in the critical
attrition area always occurred in a shorter period of time than the majority of kills
from the entire battle area. In the sample mission, this focused the critical attrition
period down to approximately 08:15 to 09:00 hours.
A specific critical ground force attrition time had to be selected using the
critical attrition area times shown in the lower histogram of Figure 19. This time
would be used to take a "snapshot" of live vehicles on the battlefield and calculate
concentration measures of these live vehicles. This shapshot needed to be taken just
before the critical attrition period, since this is the logical time to have forces massed
and the live vehicle concentration can be checked as a predictor of attrition. In order
to avoid the early kills (outliers) and to have a standard rule for all missions, the
critical ground force attrition time was defined as the time when 25 percent of kills
had occurred in the critical ground force attrition area. In the sample battle, this time
was 8.24 or 08:14:30 hours as shown in Figure 19.
B . DETERMINATION OF CONCENTRATION AT THE CRITICAL
GROUND FORCE ATTRITION TIME
Two different concentration measures of live attacking vehicles at the critical
ground force attrition time were obtained using the following techniques. First, the
live vehicle position data was obtained from the Screened Ground Vehicle Position
Location Table (SGPLT) as described in Chapter IV, Section D. These live vehicle
locations formed a scatter plot of points, with grid coordinates represented by the X
and Y axes as seen in Figure 20. The defending OPFOR vehicles are represented by
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Figure 19. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Attrition Time Histograms
Although all OPFOR vehicles in the plot are instrumented, only a certain
number are actually "playing" in this battle and defending terrain in the vicinity of the
BLUEFOR objective. A density contour plot is taken of just these "playing"
vehicles in order to get an idea of the center of the OPFOR defensive position. The
OPFOR defensive position, with the same density contours is magnified in Figure
21. The approximate density center of the defensive position is shown with an X.
The attacking BLUEFOR vehicle locations are now shown with their identification
or "bumper" number which identifies the parent unit of the vehicle.
The first measure of ground force concentration dealt solely with the distance of
live attacking vehicles from the center of the defensive position. The rectangular
(X, Y) coordinate system was shifted to a (X', Y') system, so that the origin
corresponded with the defensive position center. The distance from the origin
(called r) was calculated for each attacking vehicle using the distance formula
r=\ X' +Y' . These distances were then used to find the circular radii (centered on
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the defensive position) enclosing 25, 50, and 75 percent of the attacking vehicles.
This was accomplished by taking the first (rQ(25)), second (rQ(50)), and third (rQ(75 ))
quartiles of the r distances. For example, the tq(25) radius means that 25 percent of
all vehicle locations fall within the radius and 75 percent of vehicles are outside the
radius. Quartile radius tq(0) is equal to zero, by definition. The above mentioned
quartile radii formed the first category of ground force concentration predictor
variables. The tq(25) and tq(50) circles are shown for mission MA870212 in Figure
21.
The second measure of ground force concentration is an area measure which
combined the above quartile radii measures with a measure of the angular dispersion
of attacking vehicles. The measure of attacking vehicle angular dispersion (called c)
was obtained in the following manner. The location of attacking vehicles in (X', Y')
rectangular coordinates was converted to (r, 0) polar coordinates. The conversion
Y'
to r is shown above and 6 is obtained from the relationship tan 9 = ^tt. In APL, if
the location is in the two left quadrants (X' < 0), 9 has to be adjusted by n, in order
for its range to be -Ft to IL
The best fitted line from the origin through attacking vehicle locations was
obtained using ordinary least squares regression applied in the polar framework,
on r. This best fitting line corresponds to the actual aggregated task force attack axis.
In the technique, vehicle locations were plotted in terms of r and 9, as shown on the
left side of Figure 22. Locations that had a completely different direction and
distance from the other locations were considered for exclusion as outliers. Such
exclusions, however, happened very seldom; at most two locations were excluded
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Figure 20. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Live Vehicle Locations at
08:14:00 hours
Figure 21. Deliberate Attack MA870212 Live Vehicle Location
Magnification at 08:14:00 hours
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Since the 6 versus r plot showed a nonlinear trend, a power transformation
(called rt) of the r coordinate was utilized with rt = - (r p - 1). The 9 value plotted
against rt is shown on the right side of Figure 22. The transformed plot appeared to
be linear. Simple regression using the least squares method was then performed on
A
the transformed data to find the best fitted line given by the equation 9 = a + b(rt).
Using a power transformation value of p = - 2 worked well in all selected missions
to obtain a more linear trend and to improve the homogeneity of variance and the
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Figure 22. Deliberate Attack MA870212 6 versus r and rt Plots
The regression residuals (called rr) were then taken and the first (itq(25)) and
third (itq(75)) quartiles calculated in order to find the interquartile range (IQR) of the
rr distribution, using itiqr = (itq(75)) - (itq(25)). The relation of the interquartile
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range (IQR) to standard deviation (a) is 1.5(IQR) = 2a. Using c = 1.5(IQR) as the
measure of angular dispersion, the fitted regression equation was modified to:
©upper = a + b(rt) + c
A
= a + b(rt) ± c, where 6 = a + b(rt)
©lower = a + b(rt) - c
The fitted lines corresponding to (r, ©upper) and (r, Glower) are shown for the
sample mission in Figure 23, as well as the circles corresponding to the tq(25) and
tq(50) quartile radii.
The second measure of ground force concentration was then derived as the area
in Figure 23, bounded by the 6upper . ©lower fitted lines and selected quartile radii.
This area, which is shaped as a cornucopia, was obtained by the following
integration:
Area = J *dx dy = >>rdr dO
A A'










r = [l+p(rt)] p ^r = [l+p(rt)] p
1 l
--\
Area = U [ 1 +p(rt)] p [ 1 +p(rt)] p drt d6 .
A"
This had the advantage that A" is a parallelogram in the (it, 6) plane
9 = a + b(rt) ± c


















(o) and rtQ(25) are transforms of the selected quartile radii.
To integrate, let
w = [l+p(rt)] p dw = 2[l+p(rt)] p drt.
Then
Area = 2c

















if the zero and first quartile radii were selected for integration limits. This area
formed the second category of ground force concentration predictor variables,
which combined the quartile radii (jq) with a measure of the attacking force's angular
dispersion (c). Both categories of predictor variables are checked in Chapter VIII
for correlation to the deliberate attack measure of effectiveness for each mission.
Figure 23 is the graphical predictor variable representation for the sample
"good" BLUEFOR deliberate attack with MOE of 67.16 percent. To contrast,
Figure 24 shows a "bad" BLUEFOR deliberate attack (MA880324) that has an
MOE of 25.52 percent. This mission occurred near TV Hill in the Hill 909 training
area with the task force attacking west. Finally, Figure 25 shows one of the OPFOR
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attacks (AA870225), with an MOE of 53.19 percent. This OPFOR attack occured
in the Siberia training area. The concentration predictor variables shown in Figures
23, 24, and 25 are further analyzed and discussed in Chapters VIII and IX.
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Figure 24. BLUEFOR Deliberate Attack AA880324 Concentration
Graphics
X COORDINATE
Figure 25. OPFOR Attack AA870225 Concentration Graphics
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VIII. RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
A . COMPARISON OF SCREENED KILL EVENT DATA WITH
SUMMARY KILL DATA FROM MISSION TAKE HOME
PACKETS
The deliberate attack measure of effectiveness (response variable) described in
Chapter VI, Section B is based on the summary attrition data in each mission's Take
Home Packet. This is the most accurate summary kill data available, since it was
produced by NTC observer controllers, but the time associated with each kill is not
listed. In order to derive the ground force concentration (predictor variables) in
Chapter VII, kill event times were needed. Therefore, the screened kill event table
(SKET) was taken from the NTC database. The SKET kill data is not as accurate as
data from the take home packet, due to the NTC instrumentation problems discussed
in Chapter IV, Section A. A comparison of tank killing armored vehicle kills in the
SKET versus the Take Home Packet is listed in Table 12. Also, the initial
BLUEFOR and OPFOR force levels are shown. The average percentage of Take
Home Packet kills that are listed in the SKET is 77.5% for selected BLUEFOR
attacks, 51.7% for selected OPFOR attacks, and 72.4% overall. These discrepancies
in the attrition data will induce a larger unexplained variance when comparing
predictor and response variables. The highlighted BLUEFOR mission MA870317
and OPFOR mission AA880320 had the lowest percent correlation between Take
Home Packet and SKET kill data. These two missions are discussed further in
Section C below. Since the SKET is the most accurate source of kill event data
available from each mission, it was assumed that the SKET data is a representative
sample of the total kills recorded in the take home packet.
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TABLE 12. ATTRITION DATA FROM TAKE HOME PACKET AND
SKET
BLUEFOR DELIBERATE ATTACKS
Mission BLUEFOR OPFOR BLUEFOR Killed OPFOR Killed % Kill Comparison
(Chronological) Initial Force Initial Force SKET/THP SKET/THP (SKET+THP)*100
MA870212 41 14 24/24 16/1 3 108.1
MA870220 38 14 20/23 13/1 3 91.7
AA870220 34 14 6/1 4 3/1 37.5
AB870301 32 27 20/27 5/1 67.6
MA870317 3 7 15 4/ 1 8 4/6 33.3
MA870319 33 14 24/22 11/12 102.9
AA870432 32 14 1 1/21 7/6 66.6
MA870604 42 17 1 8/21 1 3/9 103.3
MA870626 39 16 23/26 1 7/1 6 95.2
MA870806 40 162 30/30 38/58 63.6
MA870828 45 22 24/34 6/9 69.8
AA871 1 15 32 16 1 1/27 1 9/7 88.2
MA871233 33 18 1 7/24 12/1 6 72.5
MA871308 40 22 26/29 8/2 109.7
MA871409 44 13 26/32 8/1 2 77.3
AA871421 36 16 28/28 1 0/1 5 88.4
MA880212 39 28 18/27 9/5 84.4
MA880220 27 34 6/1 2 5/1 1 47.8
AA880324 32 30 1 6/21 3/5 73.1
MA880422 31 14 14/1 8 6/4 90.9
AA880614 37 22 1 6/20 3/4 79.2
AA880627 39 9 1 6/26 1 5/7 93.9
MA880632 42 42 22/1 8 12/35 64.2
MA881053 38 38 24/32 13/38 52.9
Mean BLUEFOR % Kill Comparison:
OPFOR ATTACKS
77.5
AA870225 37 134 15/25 50/82 60.7
MA871312 36 131 24/24 43/53 87.0
AA880212 36 139 1 4/34 29/81 37.4
AA880320 3 6 126 1/28 2/4 1 4.3
MA880415 37 141 18/33 29/40 64.4
MA880618 38 127 2 3/27 55/1 05 56.5
Mean OPFOR % Kill Comparison:




B. REGRESSION DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Simple regression using the least squares method was conducted to check how
much of the variation in the deliberate attack MOE (response variable) could be
explained by each of the predictor variables. The simple regression model, in which
there is only one predictor variable is
y = P + Pix + e
where P + p 2x is the relationship between x and y and e is the error term, which
could be caused by model error, if all relevant predictors were not considered, or
random error. The regression equation derived from this model is
y = b + bjx
where b is the regression constant, bj is the regression coefficient, and y is the
predicted (fitted) value of y, given x. The significance level (a) of the regression
analysis of variance (ANOVA) table was initially checked to see if a < .05. This is
the conventional a level for rejecting the null hypothesis that (3j = 0. Also, the
2 2
square of the correlation coefficient (R") was calculated. R is the fraction of the
variation in the response variable (y) that is explained by the predictor variable (x).
If the a and R measures were promising, the homogeneity of variance and
normality assumptions in the least squares regression method were checked. The
homogeneity of variance was tested by splitting the residual data in half (Resj, Res2),
ordered on the predictor variable x. The sample variance was calculated for each half
using
,2
I(Res - |iRes ior2)
2
S' YIX(l)or(2)- (n lQr2 - 1)
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Then, the F statistic was obtained by dividing the larger sample variance into the
smaller sample variance
f = s!yixo) of f= ^yixoi
S YIX(2) S YIX(l)





- 2, \)2 = n2
- 2 or x>
l
=n2 -2,v2 = n l -2.
The significance level (a) of the null hypothesis c
Y
= a2 could then be compared to
see if a >.05, which would indicate homogeneity of variance. Normality of
residuals was tested using the % goodness of fit test. This involved grouping
standardized residuals into categories and comparing the actual frequencies (F) with
the theoretical frequencies (f). The null hypothesis is that the residuals are normal
with mean = and variance = S Yix- " tms nu^ hypothesis is true,
2 V (F - f)2
X < Z-t f~~> with degree of freedom \)j = # of categories - 2.
Multiple regression could be used to check more than one predictor variable
according to the model
y = Po + Pi x i + - + Pkxk + e
and fitted equation
y =b + b 1x 1 + ... + bkxk .
However, multicollinearity, or correlation between predictor variables (xk ), has to
be checked, since if serious multicollinearity exists among predictor variables, the
regression coefficients (bk) are not good predictors and their effects are confounded
with other coefficients.
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C. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF QUARTILE RADII
CONCENTRATION VS DELIBERATE ATTACK MOE
The tq(25), rQ(5o>, tq(75) quartile radii concentration measures are listed in Table
13 for all selected BLUEFOR and OPFOR attack missions. It became immediately
apparent that highlighted BLUEFOR mission MA870317 and OPFOR mission
AA880320 were outliers in all quartile radii categories. Upon checking the attrition
data comparison in Table 12, the reason became clear. These two missions had the
lowest percent correlation between Take Home Packet and SKET kill data. The two
missions were eliminated from the rest of the analysis based on SKET kill data not
adequately representing actual kill events.
The regression fit of the BLUEFOR deliberate attack MOE against quartile radii
is shown in Figure 26. The tq(25) and tq(50) regression significance levels (a) are
both less than .05. The square of the correlation coefficient (R") shows a moderate
(.405 for tq(25)) and a moderately low (.252 for tq(50)) fraction of the MOE variance
explained by the predictor variable. The homogeneity of variance and normality
assumptions appeared valid for the rQ(25) and tq(50) fits, as shown in Table 14.
Therefore, tq(25) and tq(50) appear to have a statistically significant effect on the
deliberate attack MOE. Multiple regression was not conducted in this category
because of the obvious multicollinearity (or correlation) between quartile radii
measures for each mission.
The regression fit of the OPFOR attack MOE against quartile radii is shown in
Figure 27. The regression significance levels (a) are all greater than .05 and the
squares of the correlation coefficient (R~) are low. This lack of regression fit could
be caused by a small sample size and a small range of the attack MOE (48 - 72
percent).
62
TABLE 13. QUARTILE RADII RESULTS
BLU EFOR DELIBERATE ATTACKS
Mission MOE (%) Quartile Radius Quartile Radius Quartile Radius
(MOE Ranked) fQ(25) (km) TQ(50) (km) rQ(75) (km)
MA880632 70.238 3.017 4.405 12.220
MA870212 67.160 2.581 4.554 12.818
MA870626 66.667 1.769 2.400 5.072
MA870220 66.165 2.004 5.351 31.549
AA870220 65.126 1.831 3.065 12.338
MA871409 59.790 2.729 3.017 3.799
MA870319 59.524 4.239 4.787 12.218
MA871233 58.081 4.126 4.857 15.967
AA871421 57.986 1.352 4.427 7.853
MA881053 57.895 2.929 3.380 7.524
AA880627 55.556 4.049 6.907 21.794
MA870604 51.471 3.458 4.812 6.213
MA870317 45.676 10.319 14.814 17.991
MA880220 43.954 3.979 4.634 7.384
AA870432 38.616 3.136 3.961 13.396
MA880422 35.253 4.306 6.050 13.894
MA870828 32.677 2.600 2.943 3.469
AA880614 32.064 5.787 7.794 1 1.967
MA870806 30.401 4.148 4.869 7.751
AA871 1 15 29.688 4.488 12.120 18.476
AB870301 26.331 3.331 4.628 8.035
AA880324 25.521 6.635 9.104 16.807
MA880212 24.313 3.148 4.506 7.975
MA871308 18.295 5.456 7.471 9.253
OPFOR ATTACKS
MA880415 80.410 6.386 8.532 12.978
AA880320 72.619 15. 101 16.586 1 7.485
AA880212 68.086 1.545 3.031 12.678
MA871312 63.104 4.209 7.823 14.308
AA870225 53.187 4.653 8.620 16.658
MA880618 48.554 3.722 8.156 16.334
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Figure 26. BLUEFOR Deliberate Attack MOE against Quartile Radii
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Figure 27. OPFOR Deliberate Attack MOE against Quartile Radii
TABLE 14. HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE AND NORMALITY
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D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF QUARTILE RADIUS AND
ANGULAR DISPERSION AREA OF CONCENTRATION VS
DELIBERATE ATTACK MOE
The angular dispersion (c) and area of concentration measure (c[rQ
(25)] ) are
listed in Table 15 for all selected BLUEFOR and OPFOR attack missions. When
both these measures were plotted against the deliberate attack MOE, the density of
points was not uniform; point density was shifted to the left. To even the density of
points, the power transform (\c) and area transform ( vc[rQ(25)] ) were taken and the
regression fit of the deliberate attack MOE against these transforms is shown in
Figure 28. The regression significance levels (a) are all greater than .05 and the
squares of the correlation coefficient (R ) are low.
The angular dispersion measure c does not appear to have a statistically
significant influence on the deliberate attack MOE when compared alone, or when
combined with tq
(25) in the area concentration measure for all missions. Again, with
OPFOR missions, this lack of regression fit could be caused by a small sample size
and a small range of the attack MOE. The OPFOR plots in Figures 27 and 28 can,
however, show a rough OPFOR estimate of the selected concentration measures.
A multiple regression was conducted on the deliberate attack MOE against both
fQ(25) and Vc. The best fitting equation was y = 68.51 - 7.76rQ (25) + 6.99V c and
2 2
the R was .413, a slight improvement in the simple regression R of .405 for
rQ(25). The correlation between the two predictor variables was low with a
correlation coefficient of .29.
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TABLE 15. QUARTILE RADIUS AND ANGULAR DISPERSION
AREA RESULTS
BLUEFOR DELIBERATE ATTACKS
Mission MOE (%) Angular Angular Area Measure Area






C (radians) Vc ^C[rQ(25)]
MA880632 70.238 0.762 .873 6.940 2.634
MA870212 67.160 0.647 .804 4.308 2.076
MA870626 66.667 1.036 1.018 3.242 1.801
MA870220 66.165 0.680 .824 2.731 1.652
AA870220 65.126 0.505 .711 1.695 1.302
MA871409 59.790 1.883 1.372 14.025 3.745'
MA870319 59.524 1.325 1.151 23.800 4.879
MA871233 58.081 0.390 .625 6.641 2.577
AA871421 57.986 0.602 .776 1.101 1.049
MA881053 57.895 0.914 .956 7.842 2.800
AA880627 55.556 0.283 .532 4.646 2.155
MA870604 51.471 0.358 .598 4.277 2.068
MA880220 43.954 0.218 .467 3.459 1.860
AA870432 38.616 0.621 .788 6.112 2.472
MA880422 35.253 0.615 .784 11.397 3.376
MA870828 32.677 0.983 .991 6.642 2.577
AA880614 32.064 0.243 .493 8.126 2.851
MA870806 30.401 0.474 .689 8.160 2.857
AA8711 15 29.688 0.508 .713 10.240 3.200
AB870301 26.331 0.304 .551 3.369 1.835
AA880324 25.521 0.318 .564 14.005 3.742
MA880212 24.313 0.495 .703 4.906 2.215
MA871308 18.295 1.112 1.055 33.106 5.754
OPFOR ATTACKS
MA880415 80.410 0.433 .658 17.656 2.765
AA880212 68.086 0.922 .960 2.201 1.425
MA871312 63.104 0.435 .660 7.711 1.832
AA870225 53.187 0.372 .610 8.061 1.733
MA880618 48.554 0.705 .840 9.772 2.626
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Figure 28. Deliberate Attack MOE against Angular Dispersion and
Area Transforms
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND MILITARY APPLICABILITY
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following hypothesis was tested for validity. Given a task force deliberate
attack mission conducted under NTC conditions, there exists a relationship between
the degree of ground force concentration at the battle point of critical attrition
(predictor variable) and a deliberate attack MOE (response variable). Two categories
of predictor variables were developed. The first category used quartile radii
measures as a way to measure the closeness of the attacking force to the center of the
defending force at the critical ground force attrition time. The radius quartile that
measured the distance of the closest 25 percent of attackers (rQ(25>) had the best
statistically significant relationship (for a single predictor) to the deliberate attack
MOE, with an R value of .405. The radius quartile rQ
(50) also had a statistically
significant relationship with an R value of .252, as shown in Chapter VIII, Section
B.
There are obviously other predictor variables that influence this attrition-based
deliberate attack MOE. However, when studying the scatter plot of these two
quartile radii, it appears that the massing of combat power at the critical attrition time
is a prerequisite to mission success. Task forces with deliberate attack MOEs above
50 percent have all massed 25 percent of their combat power within approximately 4
kilometers of the enemy center. These same successful units have all massed 50
percent of their combat power within approximately 5 kilometers of the enemy
center. This massing of combat power does not ensure mission success. There are
units that have achieved the appropriate 25 and 50 percent quartile radii, but still
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have a MOE much below 50 percent. Once a task force's combat power is
appropriately massed, the unit has to convert this combat potential into enemy
attrition and friendly survival through synchronized direct fire and maneuver, in
combination with other combat multipliers.
The effect of attacking force closeness is clearly seen in the five OPFOR attacks
analyzed. Even though these were regimental attacks with approximately 140
vehicles (versus BLUEFOR task force attacks of approximately 40 vehicles), the 25
percent concentration radius was consistently under 6 kilometers. The MOE
performance of these OPFOR attacks was good since they were centered above 50
percent.
The second category of predictor variables dealt with angular dispersion (c) and
a derived area of concentration (c[rQ
(25)] ). Their effect on BLUEFOR deliberate
attack performance is not clear from this analysis. The transformed angular
dispersion (Vc) and area measures ( vc[rQ(25)] ) did not significantly correlate with the
MOE, using simple regression analysis, as shown in Chapter VIII, Section D. A
multiple regression was conducted on the deliberate attack MOE against both tq(25)
and Vc, but the resulting R" of .413 was only a slight improvement in the simple
regression R of .405 for rQ(25).
As discussed in Chapter V, task forces should doctrinally isolate and exploit a
weakly defended penetration site during the deliberate attack, in order to defeat the
enemy in detail with overwhelming combat power. Therefore, successful attack
missions should doctrinally show relatively narrow angular dispersion and a
smaller area of concentration at the critical ground force attrition time. The fact that
this trend was not seen might be due to some successful units not using these
doctrinal tactics, or due to accuracy and variance problems in the selected data.
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When the five OPFOR attacks were checked for angular dispersion and area of
concentration, the results seemed more consistent than with the BLUEFOR attacks.
Even with approximately three times the number of combat vehicles, the angular
dispersion was consistently below .9 radians, which indicates a narrow attack
dispersion at the critical ground force attrition time.
B . MILITARY APPLICABILITY
The following list summarizes the possible applications of the methodology and
results of this thesis:
• The tq
(25) and tq(50) predictor variables can be used as training standards to
check a task force's ability to mass forces at the battle critical attrition point.
Also, commanders can use these standards as a deliberate attack mission goal
in training for NTC.
• The screening procedure used to obtain kill event data and live vehicle
positions is currently the most accurate way to filter this information in the
ARI-POM CTC Archive. This procedure is automated and can be modified
to suit other event queries.
• The methodology of deriving the battle critical ground attrition place and time
can be used to quickly focus a dynamic battle into one of its critical static
points. This methodology can be modified for other critical event places and
times of the battle; relating for instance direct or indirect firing events, or
command and control decision nodes.
• The critical ground attrition place and time graphics, especially the relative
surface density and contour plots could be used in NTC After Action
Reviews and for any type of combat simulation results to graphically enhance
the learning process of "what happened" and help determine "why it
happened."
The following is a discussion of possible follow-on topics to this thesis. This
analysis deals with quantifying and analyzing ground force concentration, or mass,
at a critical time in the battle. In the broader sense, this mass is just part of a unit's
momentum (mass x velocity). A methodology which could dynamically monitor a
unit's changing measure of mass and momentum during the battle could be used to
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check the relationship between momentum and mission MOEs. If relationships were
found in such an analysis, the dynamic monitoring of unit momentum during the
battle could serve as a major component in a commander's tactical decision aid.
The application of the critical attrition point method to other tactical analysis is
definitely possible. This methodology allows the analyst to focus the battle, based
on selected event criteria, and then three-dimensionally view the areas of highest
relative event density. Events could take the form of attrition, indirect or direct fires,
or command and control nodes. Using three dimensional event densities, associated
with both a place and time could enhance ongoing work in the area of
mathematically comparing computer models to exercise data, using nonlinear
statistical mechanics [Ref. 13].
Since there is a discrepancy between NTC instrumented data and actual mission
results, "qualification" of the database, to include the logical addition of missing
vehicles and routes is an ongoing project at the ARI-POM CTC Archive. Further
work is essential in order to relate NTC data to high resolution combat models, such
as Janus and to unit combat simulators, such as SIMNET.
Analysis on unit training and performance at the Army's Advanced Collective
Training Centers, such as NTC, is an ongoing mission of ARI's Presidio of
Monterey Field Unit (ARI-POM). Part of this effort is a unit effectiveness
measurement system at NTC, being developed by resident contract personnel at
ARI-POM [Ref. 7]. Further work is needed to quantify mission measures of
effectiveness and the collective tasks that make up these missions.
Finally, the concept of testing and enhancing high resolution combat models,
such as Janus, and unit combat simulators with data from large-scale combat
simulations is in its infancy. The potential exists to develop and test parameters
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related to human factors, such as fatigue, intelligence levels, and training proficiency
in controlled simulations and then compare these results using a "reality check" from
training centers, such as NTC.
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This program tailors the kill data from the PET and PSUT and increases its
accuracy in the following ways. Only BLUEFOR tank and mounted TOW
system kills, and OPFOR T-72 and BMP kills are considered. Actual
start and change of mission times are user inputs and kill events are only
recorded during this actual mission time period. A vehicle is permanently killed
after it is first killed in the PET table or it receives a PSTAT in the PSUT table of
"2" (combat loss), "3" (OC gun kill), or "5" (administrative kill). A PSTAT
"3" (accidental kill) is not considered a valid kill.
PET and PSUT arrays of length 400 (indexed on the unique armored tank
killing vehicle lpns) are created for each output data category listed below.
First time killed vehicles in either the PET or PSUT have their array entries
updated. PET and PSUT arrays are then compared and if a vehicle does not
incur a PET kill, the PSUT array is checked for a valid kill code and this PSUT
data is used in the output listing. The kill events in the PSUT table do not list an
associated location. Therefore, the program searches the GPLT to find the
vehicle's location within one GPLT time increment of the kill time in the PSUT.
USER INPUT: Mission Number, Actual Mission Start Time and Actual
Mission End Time








PET or PSUT Kill Result
Fratricide Status if PET Kill
Vehicle Location X Coordinate






































































petintime(400), ihh, imm, iss
itime(400),jtime(400)
gtime(400)
jinttime(400), jhh, jmm, jss


























C Input Mission Number, Actual Mission Start Time and Mission End Time.
doj = l, 50
type *, 'input dbname (ie. MA870212 or "//" after last mission input):'
read (*,10) dbname(j)
if (dbname(j) .eq.
'//) go to 15
type *, 'input actual mission start time (ie. 0600):
read (*,12) stime(j)
type *, 'input actual mission change of mission time (ie. 0913):
read (*,12) ftime(j)






do 1 = 1, jknt
## INGRES dbname(l)
C Initialize selected arrays to default values...













C Check PET for first occurrence of selected vehicle kills within the boundaries of
C the user input start and change of mission times, retrieve specified information
C on these killed vehicles, and update PET arrays...
## RANGE of p is PET
## RANGE of s is PSIT
## RANGE of v is PVWT
## RETRIEVE (p_time — p.time,
## p_tpid = p.tpid,
## p_tlpn = int4(p.tlpn),
## p_tx = int4(p.tx),
## p_ty = int4(p.ty),
## p_frat = p.frat,
## p_result = p.result,
## s_ptype = s.ptype,
## s_side = s.side,
## v_pvehl = v.pveh)
## WHERE p.tlpn = s.lpn
## AND s.side = v.pside
## AND s.ptype = v.ptype
## AND (((s.side = : "B") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype = "3"
## OR s.ptype = •*29"))
## OR ((s.side = "O") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype = "2"
## OR s.ptype = "3" OR s.ptype = "4")))









decode(2,50,p_time( 1 2: 1 3))ihh
decode(2,50,p_time( 15:1 6))imm
decode(2,50,p_time( 18:1 9))iss
itime(p_tlpn) = ihh + (imm/60.) + (iss/3600.)
petintime(p_tlpn) = (ihh * 10000) + (imm * 100)
+ + iss
if ((petintime(p_dpn) .ge. (stime(l) * 100))















C Check PSUT for first occurrence of selected vehicle valid kill code within the
C boundaries of the user input start and change of mission times, retrieve specified
C information on these kill status vehicles and update PSUT arrays...
## RANGE of:5 is PSIT
## RANGE of 1v is PVWT
## RANGE of u is PSUT
## RETRIEVE (u_lpn = int4(u.lpn),
## u_pid = u.pid,
## u_side = u.side,
## u_time = u.time,
## u_pstat = u.pstat,
## u_ptype = u.ptype,
## s_side = s.side,
## v_pveh2 = v.pveh)
## WHERE u.lpn = s.lpn
## AND s.side = u.side
## AND s.ptype = v.ptype
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## AND s.side = v.pside
## AND (((s.side = "B") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype = "3"
## OR s.ptype = "29"))
## OR ((s.side = "O") AND (s.ptype = " 1 " OR s.ptype = "2"
## OR s.ptype = "3" OR s.ptype = "4")))
## AND (u.pstat = "2" OR u.pstat = "3"
## OR u.pstat = "5")
## SORT #u_time
## {
if (psut_time(u_lpn) .eq. ' ') then
decode(2,50,u_time( 12:1 3))jhh
decode(2,50,u_time( 15:1 6))jmm
decode(2,50,u_time( 18:1 9))j ss
jtime(ujpn) = jhh + (jmm/60.) + (jss/3600.)
jinttime(ujpn) = (jhh * 10000) + (jmm * 100) + jss
if (((jinttime(ujpn) .ge. (stime(l) * 100))












C Since the kill events in the PSUT table do not list an associated player location,
C search the GPLT for each valid PSUT kill to find the vehicle's location within
C one GPLT time increment of the kill time in the PSUT...
## RANGE of g is GPLT
## RANGE of s is PSIT
## RANGE of u is PSUT
## RETRIEVE (g_pllpn = int4(g.pllpn),
## g_time = g.time,
## g_x = int4(g.x),
## g_y = int4(g.y))
## WHERE u.lpn = g.pllpn
## AND s.lpn = u.lpn
## AND (((s.side == "B") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype = "T
## OR s.ptype = "3" OR s.ptype = "29"))
## OR ((s.side = "O") AND (s.ptype = "1 " OR s.ptype = "2"
## OR s.ptype = "3" OR s.ptype = "4")))
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## AND (u.pstat="2"ORu.pstat = "3"






gtime(g_pllpn) = ghh + (gmm/60.) + (gss/3600.)
ginttime(g_pllpn) = (ghh * 10000) + (gmm * 100) + gss
if (((jtime(g_pUpn) + 2.5/60.) .ge.
+ gtime(g_pllpn))









C If a vehicle does have a valid PET kill recorded in its PET array, check the
C PSUT array for a valid kill code. If a PSUT kill exists for the vehicle, add this
C data to the PET arrays...
doi= 1,400


















C Create SKET Output Table Listing (ie. MA870212.datl;l)...





do i = 1, 400
































































This program tailors player location data from the GPLT at a user specified time
in the battle using the following techniques. Only BLUEFOR tank and
mounted TOW system locations and OPFOR T-72 and BMP locations are
considered. The input critical time is compared to the interval times in the
GPLT. This critical time is bracketed on both sides by GPLT times and then a
linear interpolation of both the X and Y grid coordinates is calculated, based on
time interval ratios. This provides a more accurate vehicle location at this critical
time, instead of just using the closest interval time in the GPLT. Each vehicle is
compared to the Screened Kill Event Table to determine whether it is alive or
has a PET or PSUT kill status at the user input time.
IMPORTANT NOTE: A mission's SKET file (i.e., MA870212.datl;l) has to
be generated before executing this program.
USER INPUT: Mission Number, Battle Time, Mission Date, and Ground Log
Interval









Vehicle Status - Live or Kill Result [out_result(i)],
Vehicle Location X Coordinate [out_x(i)],


















## integer*4 pet_tlpn(400), out_lpn(400), pljpn
## character* 1 psit_side(400), out_side(400), pl_side
## character*2 psit_ptype(400), out_ptype(400), pLptype
## character* 15 pvwt_pveh(400), out_pveh(400), pl_pveh
## character*3 pet_tpid(400), out_pid(400), pl_pid
## character* 1 pet result(400), out result(400)
## character* 1 pet_frat(400), out_frat(400)
## integer*4 pet_tx(400), pl_x
## integer*4 pet ty(400), pi y
## real*4 out x(400), out y(400)
## integer*4 out xl(400), out yl(400)
## integer*4 out_xu(400), out_yu(400)
## character*50 filename
## character* 10 dbname(50)
## character*8 chartime(50), lchartime(50), uchartime(50)
## integer*4 ihour(50), imin(50), isec(50)
## integer*4 uhour(50), umin(50), usec(50), uppertime(50)
## integer*4 lhour(50), lmin(50), lsec(50), lowertime(50)
## integer*4 ghh, gmm, gss
## character*9 mdate(50)
## character*20 timechk(50), ltimechk(50), utimechk(50)
## character*20 pl_time
## integer*4 gndlog(50), num kill
## character* 11 start(50)
## integer*4 i, j, k, 1, m, num_reps
jknt =
C Input Mission Number, Battle Time, Mission Date, and Ground Log Interval...
doj = 1,50
type *, 'input dbname:'
read(*,10) dbname(j)
if (dbname(j) .eq.
'//) go to 15
type *, 'input plot time (HH:MM:SS):'
read (*,12) chartime(j)
type *, 'input mission date (ie. 02 Oct 86):'
read (*,14) mdate(j)
type *, 'input gndlog in sees (300):'
read (*,16) gndlog(j)
C Convert input date/time into INGRES character string [timechk(j)]. Create
C upper and lower bound by adding and subtracting ground log interval to input





inp_time(j) = (ihour(j) * 10000) + (imin(j) * 100)
+ + isec(j)
inptime(j) = ihour(j) + (imin(j)/60.) + (isec(j)/3600.)
timechk(j) = start(j) // chartime(j) //
'
'
uppertime(j) = ihour(j)*3600 + imin(j)*60
+ + isec(j) + gndlog(j)
uhour(j) = uppertime(j)/3600
umin(j) = (uppertime(j) - uhour(j)*3600)/60
usec(j) = (uppertime(j) - uhour(j)*3600 - umin(j)
+ *60)
encode(8,20,uchartime(j))uhour(]),urnin(j),usec(j)
utimechk(j) = start(j) // uchartime(j) // '
'
lowertime(j) = ihour(j)*3600 + imin(j)*60
+ + isec(j) - gndlog(j)
lhour(j) = lowertime(j)/3600
IminG) = (lowertimejj) - lhour(j)*3600)/60
lsec(j) = (lowertime(j) - lhour(j)*3600 - lmin(j)
+ *60)
encode(8,20,lchartime(j))lhour(j),lmin(j),lsec(j)
ltimechk(j) = start(j) // lchartime(j) // '
'





20 format(i2.2, , : , ,i2.2,':',i2.2)
enddo
15 continue




out_frat(k) = ' '
enddo
num_reps =
C Read mission's SKET file listing...
do 1 = 1, jknt
filename = dbname(l) // '.datl'





















C Select the low GPLT time by bracketing it with the input time [timechk (j)] and
C the lower time [ltimechk(j)j. Retrieve specified vehicle information, including X
C and Y location, at this low GPLT time and update low arrays...
## INGRES dbname(l)
## RANGE of g is GPLT
## RANGE of s is PSIT
## RANGEofvisPVWT
## RETRIEVE (pl_time = g.time,
## pLpid = g.plpid,
## pl_side = s.side,
## pl_lpn — int4(g.pllpn),
## pLptype — v.ptype,
## pl_pveh - v.pveh,
## pl_x — int4(g.x),
## pl_y = int4(g.y)
)
## WHERE g.pllpn = s.lpn
## AND g.time < = timechk(l)
## AND g.time > ltimechk(l)
## AND v.ptype = s.ptype
## AND v.pside = s.side
## AND (((s.side = "B;") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype = "3"
## OR s.ptype = "29"))
## OR ((s.side = "0' ') AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype = "2"











gtime(pljpn) = ghh + (gmm/60.) + (gss/3600.)









if (pl_y -it. 70000) pl_y = pLy + 100000
out_yl(pl_lpn) = pl_y
}
Select the high GPLT time by bracketing it with the input time [timechk (j)] and
the upper time [utimechk(j)]. Retrieve specified vehicle information, including
X and Y location, at this high GPLT time and update high arrays...







































(((s.side = "B") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype
s.ptype = "29"))
((s.side = "O") AND (s.ptype = "1" OR s.ptype =


















if (pl_y -It. 70000) pl_y = pl_y + 100000
out_yu(pl_lpn) = pl_y
## }
C Calculate interpolation ratio, based on the input time relation to the GPLT high
C and low times. Use this ratio to conduct linear interpolation on X and Y location
C coordinates using high and low values...
## EXIT
doi = 1,400
if (out_yl(i).ne. 70001) then
ratio(i) = ((inptime(l) - outimel(i))/
+ (outimeu(i) - outimel(i)))
out_x(i) = (out_xl(i) +
+ (ratio(i) * (out_xu(i) - out_xl(i))))
out_y(i) = (out_yl(i) +
+ (ratio(i) * (out_yu(i) - out_yl(i))))
endif
enddo
do i = l,num_kill
do m = 1,400
if ((pet_tlpn(i) .eq. out_lpn(m))







C Create SGPLT Output Table Listing (ie. MA870212.1ivel;l)...



























APPENDIX C: ATTRITION SURFACE DENSITY
GRAFSTAT/APL FUNCTIONS
THIS IS THE ORIGINAL FUNCTION IN CRAFSTAT/APL WHICH CALCULATES THE
BIVARIATE SURFACE DENSITY MATRIX. THE CALCULATION OF THIS MATRIX IS
EXPLAINED IN CHAPTER VII, SECTION A. THE USER SPECIFIED INPUTS ARE DONE
USING A MENU IN THE GRAFSTAT ENVIRONMENT.
V1SHDENIU1























. .13UXVx0.51+(* 154XC-1 )x(0,i 15UXC-l)x(1.2x 154XV)+ X2- XI
15u7gx0.6)+U 15u7£-l)x(0,i 15U75-l)x(1.2x 1547g)+ 72- 71
Tl<-(( 154X7* 154X[j7 ]- 154XW*2)a( 154X75 154X[,7 ]+ 154X#*2))/l 154££T0 = p n/12 ~~
r2«-( ("15477* 154J[J ]- 1547J/+2)a( 154775 1547[J ]+ 1547tf*2))/\ 1547£
*T0=p T2)/Z~2
154S£/7?F[ Tl; 2*2]+ 154SW?F[ 2*1 : T2J+ 154W[,7 ] xi+2oolL2x ( ( ( ( 154£7[ Til- 1
54XC7_71+ l54XJ?)*2)o.+TT"T5477t Tl - 1547[2 ) 1547V)*2)*g.5
13u5W?F[ Tl; T2]+ 154SW?F[ TI : 72 - 154fi»[? xi +2ooIT2xa(( 154£7[ T13- 1
5«+XC2 77* !54X^)*2)o.+TT"l5477t 72]- 1547CJ ] ) 1547tf )*2 )*0 . 5[171 L 2:
L18J ~+(.N *<7 ±J +D/L 1
[19J l"54£U/?F+$ 1545U/?Fx4* 154XVx 1547tfx(+/ 154#)x(ol)-2
APL FUNCTION RELDENS IS A MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL CRAFSTAT/APL
FUNCTION WHICH CALCULATES THE BIVARIATE SURFACE DENSITY MATRIX.
RELDENS SEPARATES BLUE AND OPFOR KILLS WITH BOOLEAN VECTORS. AT
EACH OPFOR KILL LOCATION A RAISED COSINE BELL IS PLACED. AT EACH
BLUEFOR KILL LOCATION A LOWERED COSINE BELL IS PLACED. THE RESULTING
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